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TOWARD GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE EXCHANGE
RATE REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND:
THE WIDENING OF THE BAND
Swadesh S. Kalsi*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a commendable achievement that, in the atmosphere of a war
shattered world, it was at all possible to fashion an international currency system at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Indeed, the
International Monetary Fund represents a historic milestone in international cooperation. Since its inception at Bretton Woods, however,
the international monetary system has been plagued by two major
problems. First, the expanded use of trade constraints by countries
following policies of full employment and internal price stability tends
to foster a balance of payments disequilibrium; consequently, the present mechanism for adjustment is not satisfactory. Events after May of
1971, when the fixed exchange rates broke down, have made it clear
that a return to the system fashioned at Bretton Woods is not feasible.
The United States suspended the convertibility of the dollar in August
of 1971 and ushered in a period that saw a floating of the currencies
of major trading nations until the Smithsonian Agreement on realignment of currencies in December of that year. Six months later, in June
of 1972, the British sterling--the other major reserve currency-went
off the peg and has been floating since that time. The problem of the
undervalued and overcompetitive German mark and Japanese yen
is still very much alive. Increasingly the international monetary system
is threatening disorder and detrimental effects on world trade. President Nixon, in his opening address at this year's IMF Annual Meeting,
aptly described it as a "system that almost every year presents a new
invitation to a monetary crisis."' Secondly, no orderly arrangement
exists for generating international liquidity to meet the demands of

* B.Sc., London School of Economics; LL.M. George Washington University;
of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law.
1. International Monetary Fund-International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development Press Release No. 3, Address by the Presidentof the United States,
Richard M. Nixon, 1972 Annual Meetings of the Boardof Governors of the Fund,
Bank, IFC and IDA 3 (September 25, 1972).

expanding world trade. This article will focus on only the first of these
problems.2
Under the present institutional constraints, adjustment can be
achieved through several methods.3 The first is a complete revolution
that would adopt, for instance, a scheme such as the Triffin Plan.4
Although an ambitious solution, its implementation is not politically
feasible in our present world. Secondly, adjustment could be encouraged by resorting more frequently either to such direct controls as
tariffs, quantitative restrictions and exchange controls or other interferences with international trade-such as casting a wider net via antidumping and countervailing duty laws. This solution tends to impede
international trade, however, and for that reason is unacceptable.
Thirdly, the present excessively rigid adjustable peg system could be
modified to achieve greater flexibility. Because of the present trend
toward economic nationalism and protectionism aimed at reducing
unemployment levels, the more sensible path lies in engineering
greater flexibility into the present adjustment mechanism. This alternative would allow nations greater autonomy to pursue their domestic
economic policies of full employment and thereby reduce pressures
toward protectionism. Considering the alternatives, the widening of
the band to permit greater flexibility is a step in the right direction.
This article sets forth the adjustment problem, with an initial discussion of the present adjustment system, its shortcomings and the
merit of the wider band. The discussion then proceeds to a detailed
exposition of the present legal regime of the exchange rates against
which the legality of the widening of the band is analyzed.

II.
A.

BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM

The Problem of Balance of Payments Adjustment

Since the Keynesian Revolution the professed economic objective
of countries has been to achieve maximum growth through policies of
2. This article is not concerned with the problem of liquidity. For practical
purposes, however, the two problems cannot be completely divorced from each
other. For instance, different levels of reserves are needed under different systems
of balance of payments adjustment. A maximum of reserves is required under a
system of completely fixed exchange rates, while no reserves are necessary under a
freely fluctuating exchange rate system.
3. For some problems and their solution through various proposals see THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

(L. Officer & T. Willett eds. 1969).

CRISIS 102-20 (1960).
Under the original Triffin Plan, the IMF would have become, in essence, an
international central bank.
5. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONoMIcs 810.12 (8th ed. 1970).

4. See R.
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full employment. Because the level of unemployment in the economy
is related to the degree of inflation,' this economic objective must be
achieved with price stability. Internal price stability is of even greater
importance to major trading countries, since they must achieve internal full employment at stable prices while simultaneously maintaining
external equilibrium in their balance of payments. 6
Ideal external equilibrium exists at a neutral balance of payments
position.7 The problems arise when internal equilibria do not harmonize with external equilibria, and there are trade-offs between the
two to produce the necessary stability. Temporary deficits and surpluses may be eliminated through short-term transfers of gold, convertible currencies or international borrowing facilities. Alterations in
the value of currencies in terms of other currencies over the long run
require deliberate adjustments to correct the disequilibria. Such longterm adjustments may be effected by changing exchange rates, direct
controls, gold flows or borrowings.
Although a country with access to borrowing facilities may surely
prolong its deficit,' the adjustment must ultimately be made through
alterations in exchange rates. There are two clearly designed regimes
of exchange rates, with numerous combinations in between. At one
extreme is the fixed rate system that is adjustable through domestic
price level and income changes, as under the gold standard. In periods
of inflation this model requires that domestic incomes be held back,
while increases in productivity theoretically strengthen the country's
competitive position. Thus equilibrium is reestablished without overt
alteration of the exchange rates in the foreign exchange markets. In
the actual operation of this model, the deficit country would pursue
6. See Day, InstitutionalConstraintsand the InternationalMonetary System,
in MONETARY PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 333 (R.

Mundell & A. Swoboda eds. 1969). See also Krause, The InternationalMonetary
Game: Objectives and Rules, in APPROACHES TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY
OF EXCHANGE RATES 223 (G. Halm ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Halm].
7. A country is in external equilibrium when its rate of exchange is in
equilibrium. "An equilibrium rate is that rate which, over a standard period,
during which full employment is maintained and there is no change in the amount
of restriction on trade or on currency transfer, causes no net change in the
holdings of gold and currency reserves of the country concerned." W. SCAM MELL,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY 56 (2d ed. 1961).
8. "United States balance of payments policy since 1959 may be characterized
largely as a combination of short sighted expedients with little emphasis on longer
term solutions. Most of these policies were designed to buy time. Unfortunately
little productive use has been made of this time as far as fundamental corrections
are concerned." G. HABERLER & T. WILLETT, PRESIDENTIAL MEASURES
ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONTROLS 13 (1968).
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restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to reduce domestic expenditures, while the surplus country would adopt opposite expansionary policies. Deflation in the deficit country would increase unemployment and create an excess capacity in capital. At the same time,
an expansionary policy in the surplus country would cause a rise in
the level of prices and costs. In this way the exchange rates eventually
are brought into equilibrium. If the deficit country is fully employed
and prices are rising, deflation will control domestic demand and at
the same time produce an equilibrium in the external balance. If the
deficit country has an underemployment equilibrium domestically,
however, deflation will not reduce prices and costs so quickly. In fact,
such a country needs domestic expansion to achieve full employment.
The use of deflation to achieve external balance, however, requires
increasing restrictions on demand and rising unemployment in order
to reduce the price level. Consequently, fixed exchange rates demand
a subjugation of domestic economic objectives to the dictates of external balance.
At the other extreme is the adjustment mechanism of freely fluctuating exchange rates. Under this model, equilibrium is established by
equating the currency's supply and demand in the foreign exchange

markets without intervention by either national monetary authorities
or any international institution such as the International Monetary
Fund. Because the exchange rate is automatically adjusted in the market, 9 the external equilibrium constraint is largely removed. Consequently, this system allows countries greater freedom in pursuing
their own domestic policies of full employment, economic growth and
price stability.
B.

The Adjustable Peg System

The Bretton Woods system represents a compromise between the
fixed and freely fluctuating systems, albeit a compromise that leans
strongly toward fixed exchange rates. The bias of the system in its
present form must be understood in light of the competitive devaluations of the 1930's, which were still fresh in the minds of the drafters

9. See L.

ROBBINS, THE ECONOMIST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

98-101 (1954). Leland B. Yeager provides the counterargument in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS

107 (1966): "Monetary

independence

means freedom for recklessness and prudence alike.... And as for 'discipline,' a
free exchange rate may itself be a useful alarm signal, indicating domestic
inflationary tendencies more conspicuously than an external deficit would and
rallying public protest more promptly." See also E. SOHMEN, FLEXIBLE
EXCHANGE RATES 236-37 (1969).
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of the Fund Agreement."0 Stabilization or fixing of the exchange
rates was "the most important consideration in the drafting of the
Fund Agreement.""
Under the present system, often referred to as the "adjustable peg
system," countries fix the value of their national currency in terms of
gold and undertake to maintain that value at the pegged level, with
fluctuations allowed only within the permitted band of one per cent.
The exchange rates are not unalterably fixed, however, and disaligned
rates resulting in a "fundamental disequilibrium" may be seasonably
adjusted by altering the exchange rate in relation to the pegged price
of gold. Such alterations require the concurrence or approval of the
Fund.
C. Dissatisfaction With the Adjustable Peg System
Although the Fund Agreement assures international control over
national currency and the safeguard of the fundamental disequilibrium
concept prevents unnecessary or excessive devaluations among members, the adjustable peg system has been only mildly successful. The
problem faced by the system is that countries are reluctant to devalue
to a realistic level of exchange rates. Consequently, the concept of
fundamental disequilibrium is devoid of practical value because countries devalue only by means of major realignments in periods of crisis.
Moreover, since the realignment is from one peg to another, the official
calculation invariably makes a larger change than is needed to stay on
the "safe side." The devaluing country is left with a maladjustment of
the opposite kind to that with which it started. Moreover, the excessive change incidentally creates a deficit for another country. Even in
the face of fundamental disequilibrium, prompt and effective exchange rate alignment is often delayed as long as possible. Only when
the short-term borrowings from financing the deficit are exhausted is
the exchange rate forced into a crisis situation requiring action.' 2
10. See, e.g., E.

SOHMEN,

INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY

PROBLEMS

(1963).
11. S. HORIE, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 102 (1964).
12. This rigidity also accentuates the liquidity problem since large borrowing
facilities must exist to take care of prolonged adjustments of internal price levels.
If available, such long-term borrowing facilities enable the deficit country to live
on the real resources of other countries! Sir Roy Harrod believes, however, that
even larger reserves are necessary to bring the present system into more effective
use: "I would submit that, as an absolutely necessary precondition of bringing the
adjustable peg into more active use, there should be set up a very large permanent
AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES

fund, analogous to the credits recently granted to the United Kingdom, for
offsetting precautionary capital flights due to the belief that a particular currency
Fall, 1972
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These adjustment difficulties are derived primarily from political
rather than economic reasons; 3 since devaluation is considered a
blow to national prestige, the act of altering the exchange rate may

involve heavy political costs.

4

The implications of this rigidity in the adjustable peg system are

extremely serious should self-discipline fail to achieve equilibrium for
a disaligned exchange rate. For if adjustment through exchange rate

variation is precluded by this rigidity, it must be achieved through
internal price level variation, which extracts a high price domestically
and is politically unrealistic in the vast majority of cases.' 5 Faced
with this dilemma, countries will be more inclined to attain external
equilibrium through the least desirable methods of direct control, such

may shortly be devalued. Without this, I do not believe that countries will be
willing to adopt a frequent use of the adjustable peg as part of their normal
policy." Harrod, The Speed of Adjustment, in MAINTAINING AND
RESTORING BALANCE IN INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS 142 (1966).
13. See, e.g.,

S.

MARRIS,

CRITICAL EXAMINATION

THE

BTiRGENSTOCK

COMMUNIQUE:

A

OF THE CASE FOR LIMITED FLEXIBILITY OF

EXCHANGE RATES (1970). Marris notes: "Many outside observers are inclined

to attribute refusal to devalue, even when this involves evident masochism, to
human weaknesses-misplaced chauvinism, ultra-conservative central-bank attitudes, failure of those responsible for managing the system to do their job
properly, and so on. But it may well be that excessive reluctance to make parity
changes under the present system is entirely explicable in terms of the economic
and political facts of life." Id. at 18.
14. Even developing countries retain hostile attitudes toward devaluations. J.
Bhagwati, in his THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL POLICY:
DEPARTURES

FROM

UNIFIED

EXCHANGE

RATES

(1968), observes the

following attitude of India toward devaluation: "In India, for example, as also in
countries that have inherited the British traditions in the civil service, there seems
to have been a carryover of the distrust and dislike of devaluations, which are
viewed practically as affronts to national dignity. Such attitudes, of course, seem
very funny in countries which have rarely had the remotest claims to having a
prestigious currency (in any sense of the term), but they are quite real, as we
discovered when pressing for devaluation in India in June 1966." Id. at 60.
15. Fritz Machlup adds the following remarks on curing the overevaluation of
the U.S. dollar: "This overevaluation could be 'cured' by means of a devastating
deflation in the United States and/or poisonous inflations in the surplus countries;
but only fools or brutes would prescribe such a cure. All responsible officials now
understand that a major realignment of exchange rates is needed to bring about
the required adjustment without subjecting several economies to damaging
deflationary and inflationary treatments." F. MACHLUP, BOOK VALUE OF
MONETARY

GOLD

4 (1971).

For the contrary and traditional view of

adjustment under the present system see P. EINZIG, THE
FLOATING EXCHANGES 178 (1970).
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as quantitative restrictions, exchange controls, tariffs and restrictions
on capital movements. 16 As previously discussed, the unavoidable
conclusion is that changes in the present system must take one of two
approaches. The first would retain the present system intact and permit increasing resort to direct controls and other interferences with
international trade."7 The alternative is the free trade approach that
would liberalize international trade and concurrently permit greater
flexibility of exchange rates. The widening of the band is one of the
proposals to engraft this much needed flexibility into the present
system.
D. Reform Through the Wider Band
At present the Fund permits fluctuations in the value of a member's currency to the extent of one per cent above or below the peg.
The proposal to widen the band, which is advocated by many
economists and an increasing number of government spokesmen, 18
envisages an expansion of this one per cent margin to five per cent. 19
The wider the band, the nearer the proposal approaches the freely
fluctuating exchange rate model.2"
The present de facto wider band regime of the Fund allows fluctuations of up to two and one-quarter per cent from the peg at par
value or central rate. The flexibility of the regime is restricted, however, at the upper and lower limits. At these limits the exchange rate

16. See W. SCAMMELL, supra note 7, at 106-14.
17. The same conclusion is drawn by Richard N. Cooper in his testimony
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on The International
Implications of the New Economic Policy Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
150 (1971).
18. See generally AM. Soc'Y INT'L L., LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL
7-11 (1972); G. HALM, THE BAND PROPOSAL: THE

MONETARY REFORM

LIMITS
RoOSA

OF PERMISSIBLE EXCHANGE RATE VARIATIONS
RESERVES, RESERVE CURRENCIES AND

& F. HIRSCH,

CURRENCIES: AN ARGUMENT

PRESIDENT

146-50 (1969);

24-28 (1966); ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC

REPORT

OF

(1965); R.
VEHICLE

REPORT OF THE

THE PRESIDENT

136-40 (1970); F. HIRSCH, THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: AN ANALYSIS
AND A POSSIBLE SCHEME 273-78 (IMF Staff Papers); Meier, The Bretton
Woods Agreement-Twenty-Five Years After, 23 STAN. L. REV. 235, 265-67
(1971).
19. For a criticism of the band proposal see P. EINZIG, supra note 15, at 164,
167.
20. The freely fluctuating exchange model is obviously more nearly
approximated as the width of the band is increased. This is not to say, however,
that a wider band is therefore always desirable.
Fall, 1972
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will be just as rigid as under the official one per cent system. Given
continuing upward pressure at the upper limit, the rate can increase
only through revaluation. Similarly, devaluation is necessary to correct
the rate because of continuing downward pressure at the lower limit
of the band.2 1 The proposed wider band coupled with a sliding parity
approach may provide an answer to this rigidity at the limits of the
narrow band. 2 Under this proposed scheme, very small and frequent
peg alterations would be permitted in addition to the wider band.
Instead of the abrupt and substantial adjustments in exchange rates,
sliding parity changes would be extremely small, e.g., two per cent per
annum or one-sixth of one per cent monthly.2 3 Such a scheme of
sliding parities could successfully deal with the normally divergent
balance of payments disequilibrium caused by national inflation,
superior technological innovation and differential growth. Sliding parities, however, could not cope with the infrequent case of rapid change
in a country's competitive position. In these situations, greater flexiexchange rates
bility in the form of wider bands or freely fluctuating
24
would be needed in order to achieve equilibrium.
Adoption of the wider band model offers three distinct advantages.
First, it would give greater national autonomy in the pursuit of
monetary policy without affecting short-term capital movements
through interest rate differentials.2" Secondly, it would permit
balance of payments adjustment through gradual and continuous
variations in the exchange rate. Finally, it would discourage
speculative movements as frequent changes within the band, and the
sliding parity, if tied to the band proposal, would reduce profit
possibilities by increasing the risk of losses. The first advantage
provides the most powerful reason for changing the present system.

21. See, e.g., Marsh, The Fixed-Reserve Standard: A Proposal to "'Reverse"
Bretton Woods, in Halm, supra note 6, at 261; Hunt, Recurrent Crises Plague
World Monetary System, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS Bus. REV. 6 (Sept.

1971).
22. See generally J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRAWLING PEG (1965); Halm,
Toward Limited Flexibility of Exchange Rates, in Halm, supra note 6, at 3,
16-21.
23. See, e.g., F. MODIGLIANI & H. ASKARI, THE REFORM OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM 19-20 (1971). The rate of slide/crawl

should be large enough to accommodate the maximum expected rate at which
currencies may become misaligned. The maximum rate of crawl of currencies
since World War I1has been about two per cent per annum.
24. See, e.g., W. BRANSON & T. WILLETT, POLICIES REGARDING
SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 26 (1970).
25. See F. MODIGLIANI & H. ASKARI, supra note 23, at 6.
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The political trade-off between acceptable domestic unemployment
and external equilibrium often poses a dilemma. For example, as early
as 1968 persistent United States balance of payments deficits of
increasing magnitude, combined with the Government's distate for
adjusting through deflation and higher unemployment, prompted the
Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint
Economic Committee of the United States Congress to recommend
that Congress take the initiative and propose a regime of the wider
band.2" It was within this context that the wider band proposal was
accepted by the Fund in December of 1971. The four and one-half per
cent band adopted, however, is a pure band regime and does not
contain a scheme of sliding parities.
I.

CURRENT LEGAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME

A. ParValue System
When member nations join the International Monetary Fund they
are obligated to fix the par value of their currencies. Par values are
"expressed in terms of gold as a common denominator or in terms of
the United States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1,
'
1944.""
Once the par values are fixed, member nations must maintain
these parities and insure their effectiveness. More specifically, this
means honoring the obligations of article IV, sections 2, 3 and 4(b).28
Under article IV, section 2, members are obligated to refrain from
buying gold at a price above par value plus the prescribed margin and
to avoid selling gold at a price below par value minus the prescribed
margin. 29 The wording of the section clearly prevents members from
buying gold at a premium or selling it at a discount to any party,
whether or not that party is a Fund member. The necessity of such a
provision was recognized as early as June 18, 1947. At that time the
Fund took the position that transactions in gold outside the
prescribed margins tend to undermine world exchange stability and
purchases and sales at premium involve losses to monetary reserves,
since much of this gold finds its way into private hoards rather than to
the monetary authorities."0

OF THE PRESIDENT (1969);
(1970).
27. Art. IV, § 1(a) of the Fund Agreement.
28. All article references are to the Fund Agreement.
29. The prescribed margins above and below par value are set forth in rule
F-4 of the Fund's Rules and Regulations. The upper limit of the variation must
not exceed one per cent of par value.

26. See

also

ECONOMIC

REPORT

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
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The other basic obligation of members in maintaining the value of
fixed parities arises under article IV, sections 3 and 4(b). Members
undertake to observe the prescribed maximum and minimum rates for
exchange transactions between their currencies within their territories.
Article IV, section 3, states:
The maximum and the minimum rates for exchange transactions between
the currencies of members taking place within their territories shall not
differ from parity (i) in the case of spot exchange transactions, by more
than one percent; and (ii) in the case of other exchange transactions, by a
margin which exceeds the margin for spot exchange transactions by more
than the Fund considers reasonable.
The first sentence of article IV, section 4(b) adds:
Each member undertakes, through appropriate measures consistent with this
Agreement, to permit within its territories exchange transactions between
its currency and the currencies of other members only within the limits
prescribed under Section 3 of this Article.
The foregoing provision is subject to the stipulation that margins in
excess of the one prescribed may be approved by the Fund or
authorized under the Fund Agreement. In addition, the arithmetic of
arbitrage between member currencies involving other than intervention currency widens the one per cent margin to two per cent. For
instance, assuming the dollar as the intervention currency, it follows
that if one member's exchange rate moves to one per cent premium
against the dollar and the other's to a one per cent discount, their
cross rate at this extreme would be the sum of the two permitted
margins, which is two per cent. 3 In 1959 the Fund ruled that the one
per cent margin was restricted to spot transactions involving a
member's intervention currency. Wider margins of up to two per cent
are permitted
for spot transactions involving other member cur32
rencies.

30.

SELECTED

SELECTED

DECISIONS

DOCUMENTS

OF

THE

EXECUTIVE

OF THE INTERNATIONAL

DIRECTORS
MONETARY

AND
FUND

13-14 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED DECISIONS].
31. See Fawcett, The InternationalMonetary Fund andInternationalLaw, 12
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L

L. 37 (1964).

32. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 904 (59/32) of July 24, 1959, in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 30, at 15, states: "The Fund does not object
to exchange rates which are within 2 percent of parity for spot exchange
transactions between a member's currency and the currencies of other members
taking place within the member's territories, whenever such rates result from the
maintenance of margins of no more than 1 percent from parity for a convertible,
Vol. 6-No. 1
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B. Changes in Par Value
While the founders of the Bretton Woods system adopted the fixed
exchange rate regime to encourage stabilization by fixing par values,
they clearly envisaged changes under certain conditions. The Fund
Agreement sets forth two basic conditions that must be met before a
member may revalue or devalue its currency:
(1) a member can propose a change in its par value only when it
is necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium;3 3 and,
(2) a change in the par value may be made only on the proposal
of the member concerned and only after consultation with the
Fund. 4
The first provision permits a change in the par value in the event of
a fundamental disequilibrium, but provides no definition for the
concept of fundamental disequilibrium. Consequently, a determination of whether a fundamental disequilibrium exists is within the
discretion of the Fund. An early interpretation of the term by the
Fund sheds some light, however, on the flexibility of the concept. In
September of 1946, the British Government asked the Fund whether a
member country, wishing to maintain full employment but suffering
from chronic or persistent unemployment, could take measures to
including externally convertible, currency." The legal authority for the decision is
derived from art. VIII, § 3, under which the Fund can approve multiple currency
practices. On this point see H.

AUFRICHT, THE FUND AGREEMENT: LIVING

44 & n.143 (1969). An interesting bypass
relieves a member from its obligation to maintain the value of its currency within
prescribed margins, provided it undertakes a separate substitute obligation. For
example, if a member buys and sells gold for the settlement of international
transactions subject to the prescribed margin limitations of article IV, section 2,
that member is deemed to be maintaining the value of its own currency in terms
of gold. Art. IV, § 4(b). Consequently, the member is in compliance with its
obligation to insure that exchange transactions within its territory involving its
own and other member currencies are within the permitted margins, even though
in fact that may not be the case. A member is maintaining the value of its
currency under the provision if: (a) the member freely buys or sells gold for its
own currency whenever the monetary authority of any other member so requests,
and (b) the member has no exchange restrictions on either current or capital
transactions. See Gold, The Code of Conduct, in 2 M. DE VRIES & J.
HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: 1945-65, at 560
(1969) [hereinafter cited as DE VRIES & HORSEFIELD]. The United States was
the only member who sold and bought gold under this provision. Since the recent
dollar inconvertibility, this provision is now mainly of historical interest.
33. Art. IV, § 5(a).
34. Art. IV, § 5(b).
LAW AND EMERGING PRACTIcE
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protect its economy in the face of pressure from a balance of
payments problem. The question presented was whether a country in
such circumstances was faced with a fundamental disequilibrium
within the meaning of the Fund Agreement. The Fund recognized the
existence of a fundamental disequilibrium under these circumstances.3" This case provides only a general guide, however, and since
no limits have been specified each case must be treated separately on
its merits. It is noteworthy that the Fund can object to a change in par
value proposed by a member when, in its judgment, the change is
insufficient to correct the fundamental disequilibrium.3 6 At the same
time the Fund recognizes that the necessary extent of the proposed
correctional change cannot be precisely determined. Consequently,
the member is given the benefit of any doubt in this determination.
A member faced with a fundamental disequilibrium and desiring a
change in its par value must consult the Fund on the proposed change.
The member is not required to seek the Fund's approval should the
change-together with all previous changes of revaluations and
devaluations-be ten per cent or less of the initial par value. 37 For a
change in par value exceeding ten per cent but within twenty per cent
of the initial par value, the member must seek the Fund's approval,
and the Fund is obliged to declare its attitude within 72 hours if the
member so requests. 38 For a change in excess of twenty per cent of
the initial par value, the Fund's approval must likewise be sought, but
39
If
in this case the Fund is not bound to take action within 72 hours.
a member changes its par value in spite of objection from the Fund,
the member concerned is barred from using the Fund's resources,
subject to the Fund's discretion in the matter.40 If, after a reasonable
period, the dispute between the member and the Fund continues, that
member may be required to withdraw from the Fund under article
XV, section 2(b). 4 ' In only one case to date, however, has a member
been compelled to withdraw by the application of this ultimate
sanction.4 2
35. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 71-2 of Sept. 26, 1946, in 3 DE
VRIES & HORSEFIELD, supra note 32, at 227.
36. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 278-3 of March 1, 1948, in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 30, at 17.
37. Art. IV, § 5(c)(i). Almost all major trading nations have exhausted this
ten per cent par value change.
38. Art. IV, § 5(c)(ii).
39. Art. IV, § 5(c)(iii).

40. Art. IV, § 6.
41. Art. IV, § 6.
42. In June, 1953, Czechoslovakia, then a Fund member, carried out currency
reforms and devalued its currency in excess of 40% without consulting the Fund.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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C. Multiple Exchange Rates
Under a system of multiple exchange rates, different buying or
selling rates are applied according to the nature of the transactions or
to the class of goods and services involved. Consequently, not all
exchange rates under the multiple exchange regime are related to par
43
Introduction or
value as defined by article IV, sections 3 and 4(b).
adaptation of multiple exchange rates by members, therefore, is
prohibited unless approved by the Fund." Moreover, the Fund's
approval is transitional or temporary and requires an early cessation of
the practice by the member securing the approval. This prohibition,
however, does not affect the Fund's approval of other multiple
exchange practices. 4" Although it has no authority to approve a
unitary fluctuation exchange rate, the Fund can approve a fluctuating
exchange rate if it is a multiple currency practice. 4
Under multiple currency practice, a country may make foreign
currency scarce by reducing its selling rate, by imposing a tax on its
sale or by selling it at one rate for essential imports and auctioning all
other imports to the highest bidder. These measures restrict imports
and have the same effect on international trade as quotas or tariffs.
Similarly, certain preferred exports may be encouraged by a more
favorable buying rate. Thus multiple currency practices may be used
to restrict and distort international trade4" -an end quite contrary to
the Fund's basic purpose, which is "to facilitate the expansion and
balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to
the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real
income and to the development of the productive resources of all

When Czechoslovakia failed to give satisfactory reasons for the change, the
Executive Directors declared on November 4, 1953, that it was ineligible to use
the Fund's resources. After a further elapse of time without reply from
Czechoslovakia, it was struck from the roll of members on December 31, 1954.
See 2 DE VRIES & HORSEFIELD. supra note 32, at 63-65, 389; S. HORIE, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 102 (1964).
43. Different buying and selling rates within the margin allowed by article IV,
section 3(i) do not constitute a multiple exchange practice.
44. Art. VIII, § 3.
45. See Gold, Unauthorized Changes of Par Value and Fluctuating Exchange
Rates in the Bretton Woods System, 65 Am.J. INT'L L. 126 (1971).
46. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 237-2 of Dec. 18, 1947, in SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 30, at 108-09. For an explanation of this anomaly see
Gold, supra note 45, at 127.
47. See, e.g., M. DE VRIES, MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATES: EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

282-313 (1965) (IMF Staff Papers).
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members ..... 48 Accordingly, to insure that multiple currency
practices are not detrimental to international trade, the Fund
formulated a basic policy as early as December 19, 1947, in a letter
and memorandum to the members.4 9 The guideline principles are as

follows:
(1) Members should consult the Fund before introducing a
multiple currency practice, a change in any existing multiple
rates, a reclassifying of transactions to which multiple rates are
applicable, or making any other significant change in their
exchange systems.50
(2) Members should take steps to remove multiple currency
practices that are not necessary for balance of payments reasons.
The Fund, however, will encourage members employing multiple
currency practices for balance of payments reasons to establish,
as soon as possible, conditions permitting their removal to
establish a fixed single exchange rate under the Fund
Agreement.5 1
(3) In view of the desirability of simplifying complex
multiple rate systems, the Fund will not approve such systems
unless reasonable progress is being made towards their
simplification and final removal, or at least steps that are likely
to result in such progress are being taken.5 2
(4) In order to simplify and eliminate complex multiple
will offer technical assistance as well
currency systems, the Fund
5 3
resources.
its
of
use
as the
D. FluctuatingExchange Rates
Under its Articles of Agreement, the Fund cannot approve a unitary
fluctuating exchange rate regime, i.e. a regime in which the exchange
48. Art. I, § (ii).
49. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 65-72 (1948). In 1948, France carried out currency reforms in which, inter
alia, it made an unauthorized change of par value and introduced discriminatory
multiple currency practices. The Fund disapproved of these measures and imposed
the most powerful sanction short of requiring withdrawal, barring France from
using the Fund's resources. Id. at 36-38, 76-78. See also 1 DE VRIES &
HORSEFIELD, supra note 32, at 200-04.
50. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 66
(1948).
51. Id. at 67.
52. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 649 (57/33) of June 26, 1957, in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 30, at 113.
53. Id.
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rate is determined by the market and is allowed to move beyond the
prescribed margins of one per cent above and below par value. 54 It
has been suggested that the Fund should at least approve a fluctuating
rate as a transitional device to facilitate change from one par value to
another by testing the market to determine the appropriate level for
the new par value in correcting the fundamental disequilibrium."s
Unfortunately, the Fund Agreement authorizes only the immediate
substitution of a new par value for the previous one," leaving the
Fund without legal authority to approve a fluctuating rate even in this
temporary situation. If a member were to adopt a fluctuating rate in
order to test the market for its new par value, the adoption would constitute a failure to maintain the exchange rates within prescribed margins in violation of article IV, sections 3 and 4(b). Violation of these
provisions subjects the member to the serious consequences of article
XV, although the Fund has discretion to decide whether to apply
these sanctions.
The Fund's official view has been that, although it cannot approve
fluctuating exchange rates, they may be tolerated temporarily in
emergencies, e.g., when they are needed to enable a member to
prevent a breakdown in its trade."' In these circumstances the Fund
will exercise discretion in favor of the member and refrain from
declaring it ineligible to use the Fund's resources. Ultimately,

54. See also materials cited note 32, supra.
55. See, e.g., Muhammad, Some Aspects of the Exchange Rate Policy of the
IMF, PAKISTAN ECON. J. (Sept., 1951); Hunt, supra note 21, at 7-8.
56. Art. IV, § 5. "A member of the Fund cannot, within the terms of the
Articles of Agreement, abandon a par value that has been agreed with the Fund
except by concurrently proposing to the Fund the establishment of a new par
value. What a country can do under the circumstances described above is to
inform the Fund that it finds itself unable to maintain rates of exchange within
the margins of its par value prescribed by the Fund Agreement, and, accordingly,
that it is temporarily unable to carry out its obligations under Sections 3 and 4(b)
of Article IV." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 40 (1951).
57. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 26

(1948); EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND,

THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE RATES IN THE ADJUSTMENT

OF

INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS 27 (1970). "A system of fluctuating exchange is
not a satisfactory alternative to the par value system. But there may be occasional
and exceptional cases where a country concludes that it cannot maintain any par
value for a limited period of time, or where it is exceedingly reluctant to take the
risks of a decision respecting a par value, particularly when uncertainties are
considered to exist." ANNUAL
MONETARY FUND 39 (1951).
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however, the member may be required to withdraw 8 if it persists in
maintaining flexible exchange rates in violation of the Fund
Agreement.5 9

E. Members'Duty to Collaborate
The Fund has developed customary international monetary law in
implementing its basic strategy of promoting exchange stability,

maintaining orderly exchange arrangements and avoiding competitive
exchange depreciation among members.6 0 This strategy is imposed
upon the members of the Fund as an individual obligation under
article IV, section 4(a):
Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to promote
with other
exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
61
members, and to avoid competitive exchange alterations.
The Fund has relied on this broad provision in requiring or
recommending desirable conduct or prohibiting behavior on the part
of the members.6 2 This provision becomes even more important in

58. That is the sanction of art. XV, § 2.
59. Interestingly, Fund practice has been more tolerant of fluctuating rates in
the less developed countries.
TIONAL MONETARY

EXECUTIVE

FUND,

DIRECTORS OF THE INTERNA-

supra note 57, at 26-28. The only developed

country adopting flexible exchange rates is Canada, which adopted the practice
from 1950 to 1962 and again since 1970. There have been instances in which
members temporarily instituted fluctuating rates. For example, Germany let its
rate fluctuate with the market from September 30, 1969, to October 26, 1969, to
determine the mark's true market value. It is a misnomer, however, to call the
Canadian regime "temporary." It is nevertheless tolerated as a valid exception to
the par value system. For a history of fluctuating exchange rates and the Fund
members see 2 DE VRIES & HORSEFIELD, supra note 32, at 152-73.

60. Art. 1, § (iii).
61. Art. IV, § 4(a). Note that a similar provision is incorporated in members'
obligations on Special Drawing Rights. Article XXVIII states: "In addition to the
obligations assumed with respect to special drawing rights under other Article of
this Agreement, each participant undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and
with other participants in order to facilitate the effective functioning of the
Special Drawing Account and the proper use of special drawing rights in
accordance with this Agreement."
62. See Joseph Gold's excellent essay, The Duty to Collaborate with the
InternationalFund and the Development of Monetary Law, in LAW, JUSTICE
AND EQUITY: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO G. W. KEETON 137-51 (R. Holland &
G. Schwarzenberger eds. 1967).
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formulating exchange rate policies in situations in which the Fund
Agreement is silent or does not provide the clarity and detail required
to deal with a threat to the Bretton Woods system. For example, in
1948 France made an unauthorized change of its par value and
instituted discriminatory multiple currency practices that were not
approved by the Fund.6 3 The Fund issued the following obligations
on members by the authority of article IV, section 4(a):64
(1) Fund approval was necessary for the introduction or adoption
of discriminatory currency arrangements involving rates of exchange
such as those instituted by France at the time.
(2) Neither the former par value nor the new exchange rates for the
franc were binding on members, and they were not bound to take
appropriate steps to insure that these new rates were observed in exchange transactions in their territories.
(3) France was obliged to cooperate with the Fund to keep the ill
effects of its unauthorized changes to a minimum, and as soon as
possible, to collaborate with the Fund to achieve the objects and
purposes of the Fund Agreement.
(4) Other members were not released from exchange rate obligations under the Fund or allowed to resort to retaliation against the
franc. They were equally obliged to limit the undesirable effects of
the French action to a minimum and hence avoid exchange disorder.

IV.

TEMPORARY ILLEGAL REGIME OF THE WIDER BAND

A.

The SmithsonianAgreement

More than seven months after the decision to float the dollar on
6
the foreign exchanges, a series of meetings of the Group of Ten, 5
from December 16 to December 18, 1971, produced the Smithsonian

Agreement." This agreement provided for the realignment of the
world's major currencies, wider margins of exchange rate fluctuations
and trade liberalization. Faced with this fait accompli, the Fund
accepted the wider band proposal and issued a press release dated

63. See note 49 supra.
64. See Gold, supra note 62, at 143-46.
65. The Group of Ten consists of the countries that participate in the IMF's
General Agreements to Borrow-Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
66. XXIII InternationalFund News Service 417-18 (1971). For an interesting
comment see THE EcONOMIST, December 25, 1971, at 10-12.
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December 19, 1971,67 that put a temporary wider band regime into
effect. Although a resumption of the par value system with the narrow
one per cent margin is contemplated, this event is not likely to occur
if the wider band proves as successful as some economists predict. In
all probability, the wider band will eventually be adopted as one of
the general reforms of the present international monetary system.
B. Dual Exchange Rate Regimes
The conduct of the members under the wider band regime is
outlined by the Executive Board Decision of December 18, 1971.68
This decision creates two exchange rate regimes. First, the old
exchange rate regime proscribes rate variations of more than one per
cent from par.69 The decision also creates a second and newer regime
applicable to those members who notify the Fund of their intention
to use the wider band. Under the wider band regime a member may
permit spot exchange rate variations of up to two and one-quarter per
cent from par value or central rate," ° giving a total band spread of
four and one-half per cent. The size of this spread presents the
opportunity for members to indulge in multiple currency practices.
As already mentioned, the Fund's position on multiple currency
practices was presented in a letter and memorandum of December 19,
1947.71 The last section of the memorandum reads as follows: "[a] n
effective buying or selling rate which, as the result of official action,
e.g., the imposition of an exchange tax, differs from parity by more
than one percent, constitutes a multiple currency practice." According
to this section, if the multiple exchange rate is within the prescribed
margins of article IV, sections 3 and 4(b), there is no breach of the
Fund obligation under article VIII, section 3.22 An unconditional
widening of the band, therefore, presents the possibility of

67. Press Release No. 862 (December 19, 1971), XXIII InternationalFund
News Service 418 (1971).
68. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 3463 (71/126), in Central Rates and
Wider Margins-A Temporary Regime in IFNS, XXIII InternationalFund News
Service 419 (1971).
69. See note 54 supra.
70. A central rate is a stable exchange rate used for exchange transactions by a
member who temporarily does not maintain par value in accordance with article
IV, § § 3, 4(b). A central rate is the equivalent of par value in pegging the
movement of exchange rates within the wider band. See materials cited note 68
supra.
71. See note 49 supra. See also IMF Executive Board Decision No. 649
(57/33) of June 26, 1957, in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 30, at 112-13.
72. See note 54 supra.
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maintaining differential buying and selling spot rates within the four
and one-half per cent band, as such rates would be within the new
prescribed margins. While a multiple currency practice at two per cent
of parity may not disturb world trade greatly, a four and one-half per
cent differential between buying and selling rates may produce a
contraction of international trade. To guard against this possibility,
the Executive Board Decision of December 18, 1971, makes the new
regime available to members subject to the condition that, within the
four and one-half per cent band spread, spot rates for buying and
selling are impermissible in excess of two per cent unless approved or
authorized under article VIII, section 3 or article XIV, section 2.11
C. Illegality of the Wider Band
The Executive Board Decision of December 18, 1971, implies
authority to establish a wider band under article IV, section 4(a) and
the Board of Governor's Resolution adopted on October 1, 1971.
As previously discussed, the broad provisions of article IV, section 4
(a) are applicable only where the Fund Agreement is silent or
ambiguous on details of practice or where retaliations may threaten
the stability of the international monetary system. In these situations,
the Fund may take the necessary steps to promote the purposes of
exchange stability or maintain orderly exchange arrangements. Article
IV, section 4(a) gives the Fund no authority either to suspend or to
amend the Bretton Woods system, and under no circumstances can the

73. See materials cited note 68 supra.
74. The preamble to the IMF Executive Board Decision of December 18,
1971, states: "This decision is adopted by the Executive Directors in order to
indicate practices that members may wish to follow in present circumstances
consistently with Article IV, Section 4(a) and Board of Governors Resolution No.
26-9, which called on all members to collaborate with the Fund and with each
other in order to maintain a satisfactory structure of exchange rates within
appropriate margins." The IMF press release of December 19, 1971, is similarly
worded: "This decision was adopted by the Executive Directors to indicate the
practices that members may follow in the present circumstances consistently with
(i) their obligation under Article IV, Section 4(a) of the Fund's Articles of
Agreement under which a member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to
promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with
other members, and to avoid competitive exchange alterations, as well as with (ii)
the Board of Governors Resolution adopted at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the
Board of Governors which calls on all members to collaborate with the Fund and
with each other in order to maintain a satisfactory structure of exchange rates
within appropriate margins."
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Agreement be construed to provide the legal underpinning for the
present regime of the wider band. A resolution of the Board of
Governors is equally ineffective to alter the basic legal obligations of
members under the Fund Agreement,7 5 unless it takes the form of an
amendment to the Fund Agreement Articles.
As a result, members adopting the wider band are in breach of one
of their basic obligations-to prevent the fluctuation of spot rates
outside the margins authorized by article IV, sections 3 and 4(b). Of
course, the use of differential buying and selling exchange rates
outside one per cent of par value constitutes the additional violation
of indulging in multiple currency practices without prior approval.
Since the Fund can approve or authorize fluctuations under article
VIII, section 3 or article XIV, section 2, however, the provisions of
the Executive Board Decision of December 18, 1971, may be
interpreted as a generalized approval for all the members."6
Article XVI,"7 which provides for a temporary suspension of
certain obligations, may be interpreted as a legal basis for the regime
of the wider band. It requires, however, a unanimous vote of the
Executive Directors and, in addition, limits the suspension to 120 days
with a maximum extension of the suspension to another 240 days,
provided the Board of Governors so decides by a four-fifths
majority."' There is no further power under article XVI to extend the
suspension except by way of amendment. 9 An amendment to
establish the wider band requires approval by the Board of Governors
prior to its required acceptance by three-fifths of all members having
four-fifths of the voting power.8"

75. IMF Board of Governors Resolution No. 26-9 on the International

Monetary System of Oct. 1, 1971, in IMF

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE

26th ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 331-32 (1971).
The Resolution itself is couched in very general terms and in fact does not set up a
regime of the wider band. The relevant directive states: "Members of the Fund are
called upon to collaborate with the Fund and with each other in order, as
promptly as possible, to (a) establish a satisfactory structure of exchange rates,
maintained within appropriate margins, for the currencies of members ...
76. See materials cited note 68 supra.
77. Art. XVI, § 1(a)(i) states: "In the event of an emergency or the
development of unforeseen circumstances threatening the operations of the Fund,
the Executive Directors by unanimous vote may suspend for a period of not more
than one hundred-twenty days after the operation of any of the following
provisions: Article IV, Sections 3 and 4(b)."
78. Art. XVI, § 1(c).
79. Art. XVI, § 1(c).
80. Art. XVI, § (a).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of a legal regime via the suspension of
obligations under the Fund Agreement obviously demands the
extremely difficult and protracted task of achieving unanimity among
the Fund members. In addition, the suspension is limited to a
maximum of 360 days. This method also courts the possibility of
adverse publicity indicating the near collapse of the adjustable peg
system. The creation of a legal regime through an amendment of the
Fund Agreement, on the other hand, is elaborate and only slightly less
stringent in terms of the voting requirements. Moreover, attaining the
requisite majorities within a short period of time is extremely
difficult. These problems have led to the establishment of an illegal
regime, but one which almost all members of the Fund have
adopted."1
For an international economic institution like the Fund, unanimity
or the requisite weighted voting majority is all the more difficult to
negotiate, since many diverse interests must be accommodated. While
most members may agree on the need for reforming the present
exchange rate regime, they often do not agree on the particular reform
proposed and the details of its implementation. The United States
Treasury has been expressing clear support for the widening of the
band since July of 1970. At that time, its proposal to widen the band
to two or three per cent was coolly received by members of the
European Economic Community, who limit their margins to as little
as three-quarters of one per cent as signatories to the European
Monetary Agreement.
In any new lasting international monetary arrangement the special
role of the United States must be recognized. Because of its very size
and virility the United States economy has a disproportionate effect
on international trade and capital movements. Moreover, the
economic issues are closely tied to United States foreign policy
interests.8 2 Whether the NATO allies should be more tolerant of the
United States deficit in light of the presence of troops in Europe at
the request of host governments is typical of the questions that would
have to be answered. Consequently, the forging of a new monetary
arrangement will require considerable time to accommodate the
economic and political interests of powerful trading nations.
The adjustable peg system is too demanding in its self-discipline
and requires an unrealistic relinquishment of the freedom to pursue
81. For countries that have notified the Fund on adoption of the wider band
see XXIII InternationalFund News Service 421 (1971).
82. Bergsten, Taking the Monetary Initiative, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 717
(1968). See also S. MARRIS, supra note 13, at 42-50.
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domestic employment policies. It is more unrealistic for a country as
powerful as the United States, in which exports represent only six per
cent of its gross national product, to pursue sharply deflationary
policies for exchange rate realignment. This would clearly be a case of
permitting the tail to wag the dog. In a world of growing protectionism and increasing economic nationalism, an international exchange
rate policy dictating alignment through deflation or inflation only
intensifies forces that strangle international trade.
The widening of the band is certainly a welcome move in the right
direction. It is not enough by itself, however, to effectuate the
broader purposes of reform-such as providing members with a
"greater independence in monetary policy and the management of the
price level, and ...the advantage of a stable, livable system that
minimizes the scope for political conflicts." 8 3 At the upper and lower
limits of the band the same undesirable features of the adjustable peg
system take over. The present band of four and one-half per cent
probably needs to be widened further and should be combined with
sliding or crawling parities. The parities must be subject to small
adjustments more than once a year. Furthermore, the Smithsonian
principle that surplus countries must share the initiation of exchange
rate adjustment previously limited to deficit countries should be
incorporated into the present reforms.8 4 When the flexibility within
the system is inadequate to accommodate the necessary change within
the band, countries should be allowed to float their currencies
temporarily"5 to enable them to gauge the size of the change more
accurately and to stifle quick profits to speculators.
These reforms raise a further and more basic question of the extent
of power granted to the Fund to enforce compliance with the new
code. To what extent should countries be prepared to surrender
sovereignty over exchange rate policies in the interests of the
international community represented by the Fund? Some argue that
the Fund needs no more than the ability to set the code of

83. F. MODIGLIANI & H. ASKARI, supra note 23, at 28.
84. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L., supra note 18, at 27. See also Volcker, Remarks at
the Annual Meeting of the Minnesota Economic Association, DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY NEWS, Oct. 27, 1972; EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM-A REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS TO

THE

BOARD

OF GOVERNORS

16-17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as IMF

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS].

85. This thought has now been expressed in IMF EXECUTIVE
supra note 84, at 21.
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behavior. 6 It probably should not have greater power to initiate the
required behavior and impose stronger sanctions for noncompliance
than those existing under the Bretton Woods system. Others
recommend a strong disciplinary approach and would prefer a transfer
of more power to the Fund, which would allow it to initiate changes
in exchange rates with severe sanctions for noncompliance." The
final solution, however, will be derived from a resolution of conflicts
that are basically political. Member countries must decide on the
degree of acceptable international discipline compatible with the
pursuit of their individual economic and political aims.
The United States view represents the broader thinking on the
present reform proposals. The Shultz proposal goes beyond the reform
of the monetary system to embrace the whole range of related
questions on trade, investment and development.8 8 While monetary
reform is essential to the continued growth of international trade,
greater progress can be achieved by the removal of the impediments to
freedom of trade and payments that have resulted from direct
controls utilized in the past. This comprehensive approach can stem
and turn the protectionist tide by combining the challenge of
formulating a lasting exchange rate regime with the concurrent pursuit
of the appropriate economic policies that will liberalize international
trade and investment.
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14 (1972).
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Governor of the Fund and the Bank for the United States, at the Joint Annual
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